The Tibetan Issue

The difficult relationship between Tibet and China in fourteen centuries of history

The Tibetan Issue
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This article is an excerpt from my book “The Tibetan Issue”, available on Amazon. In order to have an objective view of the Tibetan issue, it is necessary to impartially analyse history: not only contemporary times, but also remote eras. In this way can be better understood today’s positions, which originate from the complex relationship between Tibetans and Chinese, developed over a period of 1,400 years.

The word “Tibet” does not correspond to a single concept. Various territorial entities can be distinguished, often intersecting but not coinciding. Before approaching any discourse of a political nature, it is necessary to make clear the various meanings this name can assume:

  1. The Tibetan plateau, in a strictly geographical sense;
  2. Ethnic and cultural Tibet, which includes the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as almost all of the Chinese province of Qinghai and parts of the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu, northern Nepal, Bhutan, the Baltistan region of Pakistan and the Himalayan areas of India. The latter include, for example, Sikkim, Ladakh, Lahaul, Spiti and a large part of Arunachal Pradesh (fig. 4). The Tibetan ethnocultural zone is not monolithic, but within it there are also other populations in smaller numbers, such as Han, Mongols, Hui and Qiang, located mainly in the east and northeast of this area;
  3. Historical-political Tibet, whose last expression in chronological sense is the area administered by the government of Lhasa during the de facto independence from 1912 to 1951. In this period the Tibetan government exercised real sovereignty only over the areas of Ü and Tsang, and only partially over Kham and Amdo. Since the 20th century, this entity has also been referred to as Outer Tibet, while the ethnic Tibetan area outside of it, under direct Chinese administration, has also been called Inner Tibet;
  4. The Tibet Autonomous Region, established in 1965 within the People’s Republic of China. It borders the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan to the north and east; and India, Nepal and Bhutan to the west and south. It had 2,670,000 inhabitants in 2002 (fig. 27);
  5. “Greater Tibet” which, according to the Tibetan government-in-exile, comprises the Tibetan ethno-cultural area within the borders of the People’s Republic of China (fig. 28).
The Tibetan Plateau (Geographic Tibet)
The Tibetan Plateau (Geographic Tibet).

The Tibetan plateau has been home to Homo Sapiens since the Upper Paleolithic and Neolithic periods, as evidenced by some settlements in the southeastern valleys, where have been found stones worked to make tools, including chisels, knives, spindles for spinning, disks and arrowheads.

The traditions on the ancient history of Tibet do not provide certain information and are lost in myth. The traditions on the ancient history of Tibet do not provide certain information and are lost in myth. Although they are not historical facts, a brief narrative is reported below because they have a notable importance in Tibetan cultural identity.

An ancestral tale narrates the origin of the Tibetan people as the result of the relationship between the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara in the form of a monkey and a demoness, a manifestation of the Buddhist deity Tara. From this union, the founders of the original Tibetan tribes were born. Also noteworthy is the epic of King Gesar of Ling, which presents numerous variants, although it has a central core around which the story revolves.

The mythological chronology of the kings of Tibet sees Nyatri Tsenpo (year 127 BC) as the first sovereign by divine right, who descended to Earth through a “celestial rope” near the castle of Yumbulakhang in the Yarlung valley. According to legend, over the centuries, there was a transition from divine-style monarchies to semi-divine ones, and finally to those of a purely earthly nature.

The earliest relevant testimonies of fully historical facts focus on the figures of Namri Songtsen and, especially, his son Songtsen Gampo, who is considered the founder of the Tibetan empire, was ambitious and modernizing, supporting an expansionist policy and emphasizing centralism.

In 635 AD Songtsen Gampo's minister Thonmi Sambota undertook the initiative that gave the Tibetan language a writing system based on Indian languages. Other innovations included the transition from tribal to feudal society, the introduction of a system of weights and measures, the revision of the judicial system, and the creation of a powerful army that became the main instrument of Tibet’s imperial expansion.

On the southern front, towards the Indian subcontinent, peace was guaranteed through diplomatic policy, while towards the west the Tibetan armies moved towards the areas of Kashmir, Ladakh and Zanskar. In 638 AD, believing he had acquired enough strength, Songtsen Gampo decided to directly attack China, reaching the Sichuan plain and obtaining, by virtue of this position, marriage to the imperial princess Tang Wencheng (Gyasa in Tibetan).

At that time, the Tibetan sovereign professed the local shamanic religion Bon. According to tradition, he was converted to Buddhism by his foreign wives. The adoption of this new cult by the emperor and the court established a condition of caesaropapism, a mixture of civil and religious power, with the former prevailing, further emphasized by the myth of the divine origin of the monarchy. Buddhism was new to Tibet, but it had already enjoyed eleven centuries of history in India and five centuries in China. Contacts with China allowed the Tibetan court to introduce some innovations, such as ink and paper for writing, as well as the use of porcelain and silk clothes.

Under the rulers Trisong Detsen and Ralpachen, the country continued to expand in the direction of various oases on the Silk Road. During this period, the Tibetan armed forces defeated the Tang Empire once again, reaching the imperial capital of Chang’an (today’s Xi’an) in 763 AD, where they demanded the payment of a tribute of fifty thousand bales of silk along with the establishment of new borders.

The Tibetan Empire reached its maximum extent in 810 AD with the capture of Samarkand, thus gaining, albeit for a short period of time, military control of the Silk Road.

In 822 AD, a treaty between the Tibetan Emperor Ralpachen and the Tang Emperor Muzong was ratified, which established the end of armed conflicts between Tibet and China, along with the demarcation of their respective areas of influence.

Ethnic and cultural Tibet
The ethnic and cultural tibetan area.

After the assassination of Langdarma and the extinction of the Yarlung dynasty, Tibet experienced a period of instability and weakening of the administrative system. This era saw the establishment of the first structured Buddhist orders that would later exercise, at alternating periods, both spiritual pre-eminence and temporal power.

The country, now disintegrated into various autonomous principalities and having disappeared as a military power, began to be permeated by the influence of Buddhism, gradually linking itself to the Indian spiritual sphere through the translation and diffusion of Sanskrit texts. In the west, the kingdom of Guge was formed with its capital at Tsaparang, in the Sutlej valley, not far from the sacred Mount Kailash.

The following era is sometimes referred to as the “rebirth of Buddhism”, even though it was the first real wave of diffusion of this cult, previously relegated to the elites of the Court. In 1056, the Kadam religious order was established, alongside the restructuring of the Nyingma order. In the 13th century, the Sakya religious school, founded in 1073, acquired considerable importance under the leadership of Abbot Kunga Gyaltsen (Sakya Pandita).

In the 13th century, the Muslim armies of India from the south and the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan from the north prepared to invade Tibet: while the former were stopped by the Himalayan reliefs, the latter found no obstacles or resistance. Some local Tibetan princes spontaneously offered the act of submission to the Mongols in an attempt to avoid looting and devastation. In the east, the Mongol armies halted only at the Pacific Ocean.

China was conquered by them and Kublai Khan (1215–1294) became the monarch of an empire that, between directly controlled territories and vassals, extended longitudinally for about 8,000 kilometres, from Eastern Europe to the Sea of ​​Japan. In 1240, Godan, son of the chief Ogedei and grandson of Genghis Khan, conquered Tibet and granted governmental power to Sakya Pandita Lama in exchange for recognition of Mongol sovereignty and religious instruction for himself and his successors. The Sakya Buddhist school thus rose to a position of local political superiority with the support of the Mongol tribes, particularly against the native dynasties of central and western Tibet.

In 1260, Drogon Chogyal Phagpa, grandson of Sakya Pandita, was appointed Imperial Preceptor (Dishi) by Kublai Khan, with the power to spread Buddhism throughout the territory of the Mongol Empire. This created the relationship that the Tibetans called “Cho–Yon” (Mchod–Yon or “priest and protector”), which survived until the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in 1912. This institution, a cornerstone of subsequent claims, theoretically presupposed a superiority of the emperor in the sphere of civil affairs and a preeminence of the Tibetan Lama in spiritual affairs according to a reciprocal relationship of a master-student type. The Lama was awarded the title of Ponchen (dpon chen or “Great Authority”) which gave him the power to rule the Tibetan area. It had a subordinate system of thirteen military governors or myriarchs, each commanding a few thousand men in his own district.

By 1271, Tibet could be defined as a protectorate of the Mongol Empire. They were Mongolian and not strictly Chinese: the Han have several times retrospectively included in their history some dynasties, such as the Mongolian (Yuan) or the Manchu (Qing), originating from external invaders with languages ​​and traditions very different from theirs.

The subsequent rapid decline of the Mongol Empire led to a significant fragmentation of Tibetan territory, fomenting numerous conflicts and favoring the affirmation of the Pamotrupa clan in central Tibet. They militarily defeated the Sakya in 1358 and maintained domination over this area until 1435. The Pamotrupa rulers, starting with Changchub Gyaltsen, chose not to assign themselves a royal title, but the more modest title of desi (regent). They reformed the previous government mechanism, abolishing many Mongol customs and introducing the system of fortresses (dzong), to which each district had to refer about tributary, administrative and military matters.

During the 15th century, the influence of the Sakya religious school was declining, even on the doctrinal side, in favour of the reformed Gelug order, founded at the end of the 14th century by the abbot Tsongkhapa. It was then Sonam Gyatso, third Gelug abbot of the Drepung monastery, who received the honorary title of Ta le (Dalai, or “Ocean”, implying “of wisdom”) from the Mongol leader Altan Khan. This qualification was also retroactively attributed to Sonam Gyatso’s two predecessors, Gedun Drup and Gedun Gyatso, thus originating the lineage of the Dalai Lamas.

With the decline and retreat of the Mongols, China returned to the hands of a Han dynasty, the Ming. They generally maintained good relations with Tibet, useful for Chinese monarchs to maintain consensus among their numerous Buddhist subjects. Emperor Yongle (1360–1424), for example, showed particular interest in the Tibetan Buddhist schools Karma Kagyu and Gelug. From a political point of view, the Tibetan principalities remained rather detached from Chinese power. The Ming dynasty recognized the Pamotrupa myriarchy as sovereign over central Tibet, and the princes of Ling and Gonjo as rulers over eastern Tibet (1407). However, these acts did not imply a real vassal relationship but had the value of honorary titles, aimed at demonstrating the power of the Chinese monarch who had granted them, and accepted by the Tibetan princes as a symbol of importance and prestige.

In the fourth decade of the 15th century, the decline of the Pamotrupa clan favoured the rise of the Rinpung clan who, supported by the Karma Kagyu and Sakya religious schools, dominated the scene of civil power until 1565. Afterwards, the kings of Tsang governed a large part Tibet until the political advent of the Gelug religious school.

The definitive establishment of theocracy in Tibet can be traced back to the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, who combined the role of a temporal monarch and a spiritual leader. He established the system of government known as Ganden Potrang (Dga’ ldan pho brang).

In its basic lines, despite variations over the centuries, the Ganden Potrang existed from 1642 until the mid-twentieth century, with some characteristics that remained in the Tibetan government-in-exile. For example, theocracy remained in force until 2011, when Tenzin Gyatso renounced his temporal prerogatives, retaining only his religious role. This system was consolidated especially from the 1720s onwards.

In 1642 the Mongol leader Gushri Khan, after invading Tibet and defeating the kings of Tsang, conferred the investiture as lord of the country to the fifth Dalai Lama.

In the same years, a new dynasty gained power in China following the fall of the Ming: they were the Qing, of Manchurian origins. The first Manchu emperor, Shunzhi, invited Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso to Beijing. After some hesitation, he undertook the journey, arriving there in 1652. Sources differ significantly in describing the event: the Chinese says that the Dalai Lama accepted a role of subjection to the emperor, while the Tibetans says that it was a meeting between personalities of equal rank.

In the 17th century, Tibet experienced a long period of stability, thanks to the unification that took place under the government of the 5th Dalai Lama, even if the territorial cohesion that he had created disappeared within a few years after his death.

The Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso, in office since 1697, was unable to undertake a strong internal political action, or a foreign policy that would guarantee his security against the various powers fighting for dominance over Tibet. He is known as one of the major Tibetan poets. He mainly dealt with secular themes such as love, sorrows and the feelings of human existence. Lhabzang, khan of the Khoshut, with the consent of the Chinese emperor Kangxi, his ally, had the 6th Dalai Lama kidnapped. The latter died in 1706 at the age of just 23, probably assassinated in a conspiracy while he was being transported to Beijing at the request of the emperor.

In 1717, the Khoshut Khanate was overthrown by the invading Zungars who, with an unexpected and rapid military manoeuvre from the northwest, quickly reached Tibet. As Buddhists loyal to the Gelug school, the Zungars killed Lhabzang Khan, deposed the usurper and wanted to install the legitimate seventh Dalai Lama, who was prisoner of the Chinese emperor in Kumbum.

Initially regarded by the Tibetans as companions and liberators, the Dzungars soon turned into enemies, engaging in looting and raiding. Because of this, the Gelug hoped for China’s intervention: in 1720, after a previous failed attempt, a Qing expedition succeeded in expelling the occupiers.

The Seventh Dalai Lama Kelzang Gyatso was then taken from Kumbum and brought to Lhasa. As compensation for the military intervention, the Celestial Empire’s guardianship over Tibet. However, Tibet was not absorbed as a Chinese province, nor did it pay taxes or tributes to China. The Mongols then left the scene, leaving the Chinese to act as “protectors” of Tibet.

After a brief civil war in 1727, two amban (high officials of the Qing empire) were installed in Tibet for the first time, charged with supervising the activities of the Tibetan government. However, effective power was taken by Tibetan commander Pholhana who, with the support of the Manchus, ruled as a monarch from 1728 to 1747.

The country, geographically isolated and economically unproductive, was not strictly controlled by the Qing empire, which was more concerned with defending it from attacks by neighbouring countries. The turning point came with the position against the Chinese protectorate by Pholhana’s son, Gyurme Namgyal, who was assassinated by order of the Ambans in 1750. The crowd, furious about what had happened, in turn killed the imperial officials.

When the order was restored, Chinese tutelage over Tibet was strengthened with the conferral of the power of government to the Seventh Dalai Lama by Emperor Qianlong. After the death of Kelzang Gyatso in 1757, the power of the Dalai Lamas declined significantly as their immediate successors were politically ineffective and all died at a young age.

Relations between China and Tibet were further consolidated by Chinese intervention against Nepal and the promulgation, by will of the Qianlong Emperor, of the Regulation in 29 Articles (1793), a document that established the modalities for the exercise of the protectorate, defining in detail the hierarchy of offices, establishing the obligation of Chinese imperial confirmation for Tibetan civil offices. The Golden Urn system was also established for the election of the main religious figures by drawing lots from a list of candidates.

The 19th century was characterized by a progressive loosening of Sino-Tibetan relations, due to their internal problems. After the death of Qianlong, a long process of decline began for the Qing dynasty in China. Among other events, the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion occurred. Tibet was overwhelmed by the strong conflict that had arisen between lay people, noble factions and religious orders.

Once again, between 1854 and 1856, there were some direct clashes between Tibet and Nepal, this time without the military intervention of China. The conflict was resolved with the obtaining of some concessions by Nepal. During the 19th century, there were also some British and Russian attempts to gain hegemony over the country, but almost all failed or ended in little success.

In 1904 a British expedition, led by Colonel Francis Younghusband, managed to march with weapons into the Chumbi Valley and then to Gyantse, to finally reach Lhasa. The resulting convention established a British priority in Tibet and prohibited interference by other foreign powers, particularly Russia, which had ambitions in the Central Asian region.

China, now reduced to a state of extreme weakness, struggled to oppose it having lost much of its former political relevance and being itself at the mercy of the colonial powers. It was also squeezed between British India to the southwest, Russia to the north and emerging Japan to the east. With the arrival of the British in Tibet, the thirteenth Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso took refuge in Urga (now Ulaanbaatar) in Mongolia in 1904 and remained there for more than a year.

Meanwhile, China proceeded with repressing uprisings in the turbulent eastern region of the Tibetan ethnic area (Kham) following some serious rebellions, such as the Batang revolt of 1905.

With the Sino-British Treaty of Peking in 1906, Great Britain had in the meantime renounced its expansionist ambitions on the northern side of the Himalayas, recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, a concept that implied the autonomy of the government of Lhasa in internal administration, and the management of foreign affairs by Beijing.

In 1910, the dying Qing empire attempted to invade Tibet to reaffirm its protectorate. The Dalai Lama fled his country again, but this time to Darjeeling in India, where he remained until 1913. However, the military action was never completed due to the great changes taking place in China.

The historical-political Tibet
The historical-political Tibet.

On 1st January 1912, Sun Yat-sen proclaimed the Republic of China in Nanjing and assumed the provisional presidency following the Xinhai Revolution, which had overthrown the monarchy. On 28th October 1912, the republican government issued a decree asserting that, even under the new political structure, China would guarantee protection to Tibet. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China affirmed that Tibet was part of the state.

Upon returning to his homeland, Thubten Gyatso responded to China that, since the personal “priest-protector” bond between the Dalai Lama and the emperor had dissolved, Tibet would no longer enjoy Chinese protection. On 13th February 1913, he proclaimed what is considered the Declaration of Independence of Tibet.

Between 1912 and 1951, historical-political Tibet was an entity that presented many characteristics of a sovereign state: it had a people and a central core of land over which it exercised sovereignty. It also minted its own currency, issued stamps and passports and had an army. So was it true independence? The majority of historians and jurists believe that it was a de facto independence, because it was not recognized de jure either by China or by other international powers or organizations.

In 1913, Tibet and China were invited separately to the Simla Conference, convened by Great Britain to discuss the geopolitical structure of the Tibetan area. Here was outlined an External Tibet, autonomously administered by Lhasa (Ü-Tsang and Western Kham) and an Internal Tibet formed by the areas of Tibetan ethnicity and language under direct Chinese administration (Eastern Kham and Amdo). Great Britain declared that it could recognize a limited sovereignty but not the independence of External Tibet, while China left the conference before it ended.

In the 1920s, promoted by the Dalai Lama, a reformist program was launched in synergy with the most progressive officials, including Minister Tsarong Dasang Dramdul. The innovations concerned many aspects of public life, including infrastructure, transport, education, communications, economy, currency, army, and public administration. The armed forces were strengthened, and their personnel were increased by several thousand units. The reforms were short-lived due to the clergy’s strong opposition.

Tibetan flag
Example of a Tibetan flag in the first half of the 20th century.
The country therefore found itself completely unprepared for the challenges that history was about to pose.

Following the death of Thubten Gyatso in 1933, Tenzin Gyatso, born in 1935, was recognized as the new Dalai Lama.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Tibet voluntarily isolated itself, remaining largely uninvolved in major events and the affairs of neighbouring countries. During the Second World War, the country declared its neutrality. External isolation corresponded to a period of multiple internal turbulences, dominated initially by the conflict between the former attendants of the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Kunphel (Kunphela) and Dorje Tsegyal (Lungshar). Later politics was pervaded by the struggle between the factions supporting the two regents, the Abbot of Reting and the Abbot of Tagtra, who alternated as the highest office of Tibet during the childhood of the 14th Dalai Lama.

Even after the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1st October 1949, China continued to claim Tibetan territory as an integral part of its “motherland”, a position that had already been held by the Qing empire and the nationalist republican government. In the new state, Tibet was to be designated as an autonomous region rather than a Chinese province in the strict sense. One of Mao Zedong’s first objectives was to restore Chinese sovereignty over historical-political Tibet through military action.

In October 1950 the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Jinsha River in five points, starting to penetrate into the area directly controlled by Lhasa. The armies of the People’s Republic of China then attacked the city of Chamdo and entered it on 19th October 1950, almost without encountering any obstacles. The Tibetan forces, small in number and poorly equipped, fought as best they could, but were unable to withstand the onslaught of Communist China’s modern army, hardened by years of war.

The Tibetan government appealed to the United Nations, despite never having sought admission. Tibet’s requests were presented by El Salvador, but the Indian and British delegations pushed for them to be shelved. Tibet had no choice but to take the Beijing route: on 23rd May 1951, a delegation led by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme signed a Seventeen-Point Agreement, which formalised the annexation of historical-political Tibet to China, marking the beginning of a phase of coexistence between the traditional Tibetan institutions and the government of the People’s Republic of China.

The Dalai Lama was integrated into the Chinese administrative staff as Vice President of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Assembly. The traditional Tibetan government, while formally remaining in office, lost executive power, which was ultimately assumed by a Chinese military junta.

In 1954, Tenzin Gyatso travelled to Beijing to attend the National Assembly of the People’s Republic of China, engaging in numerous discussions with Mao Zedong. These talks raised hopes for a resolution of the issues and a cautious détente between the parties. The harmony with the “Great Helmsman” was only apparent because, although the Dalai Lama was sincerely fascinated by Marxism at that time and hoped for the implementation of economic and social reforms in Tibet, Mao’s vision was irreconcilable with the mixing of religion and politics.

When the delegation returned home, relations deteriorated due to growing popular discontent: the first protests and acts of sabotage took place, carried out both by former Tibetan soldiers who had gone into hiding and by politically active civilians in urban centres. The nationalist wing also found support in ethnic Tibetan refugees, mainly from Kham, who in the mid-1950s began to organize guerrilla actions with the support of the United States of America.

In 1957, the worsening political climate led Mao Zedong to declare that there would be no reforms in the area of historical-political Tibet for the next six years, and possibly beyond that if the population was not ready to accept them.

This tactic failed in 1959, when, amid escalating episodes of violence, the revolt spread to Lhasa and the rest of the country on March 10, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Tibetans. Not even the moral authority of the Dalai Lama was able to stop the revolt. In fact, in some cases, he was no longer considered reliable by the population, which organized itself into improvised committees and popular assemblies, led by local leaders elected on the spot.

During the revolt, a crowd of thousands of people gathered around the Norbulingkha palace, armed with improvised weapons. When the Chinese artillery began to bombard the building, the Dalai Lama had already secretly taken the road to India, disguised as a Tibetan soldier and in the darkness. From there, he hoped to undertake the search for international support for the cause of Tibet.

The caravan moved south through the mountains and valleys of the Himalayas. A few days before crossing the border, the Dalai Lama formed a provisional government at Lhuntse Dzong. This government rejected the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951, as did China itself. The Tibetan government was declared illegal by the People’s Republic of China on 28th March 1959.

The convoy then moved towards the Indian border which it crossed on 31st March – with the approval of that country – and arrived a few days later in Tezpur, a town in Assam province. It seems plausible that the Chinese military had no real interest in stopping the Dalai Lama’s escape, as he was now seen as an obstacle to be removed before proceeding with the implementation of Maoist reforms in Tibet. The Tibetan government-in-exile settled permanently in Dharamsala, India.

In Tibet it was then established a new local government that responded to the structure of a communist country. Land properties were confiscated, and thousands of monasteries (almost all) had to close. The monks had to find a job or get married.

In 1959, the International Commission of Jurists stated that Tibet was de facto independent between 1912 and 1950, and also met the criteria for de jure independence, except for formal international recognition. Also the US supporte the exiled government and the Tibetan guerrilla.

The Dalai Lama decided to undertake an action of democratization of the exile government, based on the principle of separation of powers. Starting in 1960, reforms were introduced that led to the establishment of the bodies that still exist today, often borrowed from the structure of the traditional Tibetan government and then modernized.

In 1960, eleven lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists presented the report Tibet and the Chinese People’s Republic, which denounced the violation of human rights against Tibetans.

In 1962, the 10th Panchen Lama, who remained in China, wrote a petition in 70,000 characters, addressed to the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. He described the excesses of the People’s Republic of China in Tibet, criticized the Great Leap Forward, denounced the arrests, the famines, the persecution of the clergy, and the repression of dissidents and the birth control policy. For this reason, in 1964 he was publicly humiliated and arrested.

The Tibet Autonomous Region
The Tibet Autonomous Region, established in 1965 within the People's Republic of China.

On 1st September 1965, the Tibet Autonomous Region, known internationally by the acronym of TAR, was officially born.

With the progressive regularization of diplomatic relations between the world powers and the People’s Republic of China and the consequent political détente, Tibet gradually lost importance in the eyes of the international community. From the 1970s onwards, it was definitively confirmed from a diplomatic point of view that the Tibetan issue was an internal Chinese problem. The United States also decided to abandon the program of financing and training Tibetan guerrilla.

The Cultural Revolution was just as disastrous in Tibet as it was in China itself. Here too, as elsewhere, the local government was replaced by a revolutionary committee. There were thousands of deaths from hunger, violence, torture and harsh prison.

The turning point came in 1976, when both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong died. In October of the same year, the infamous “Gang of Four” was arrested through police action. It was a group of hardline politicians of the People’s Republic of China, who were arrested after Mao’s death, and later tried and convicted.

Hua Guofeng was appointed prime minister, temporarily ousting the more moderate and pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, whose line triumphed in the following years. This was the moment when Beijing recognized the exiled government as an interlocutor on the Tibetan issue. Since 1978, some meetings took place with representatives of the Chinese government.

Some exploratory delegations were sent to the Tibet Autonomous Region to observe the actual conditions, but the envoys reported strongly negative impressions. The Chinese central government decided to try to calm the discontent with a series of policies aimed at improving economic conditions and partially restoring religious freedom.

In 1980s Hu Yaobang, secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, drew up a list of five points on which, according to Beijing, the Dalai Lama could return to China. However, Hu Yaobang’s five points seemed disappointing and unacceptable to the Dalai Lama, who believed that endorsing them would inevitably lead to a compromise on the downside.

This occurred at a time when the exiled administration was inclined to undertake a national awareness campaign that no longer looked to the old historical-political Tibet, but to a “Greater Tibet”, including the entire Tibetan ethnic and cultural area within the People’s Republic of China. The talks, although they were a turning point in relations, ended in substantial failure.policy address to the Human Rights Committee of the US Congress

In 1987, in a policy address to the Human Rights Committee of the US Congress, the Dalai Lama proposed the transformation of the entire ethnic Tibetan area governed by China (referred as “Greater Tibet”) into a demilitarized “peace zone”.

The Greater Tibet area
The "Greater Tibet" area according to the exile administration.

In 1988 began a series of riots that were not only an expression of difficult material living conditions, which had slightly improved over the course of the 1980s, but also of a resentment that now took on ethnic characteristics as the Beijing government began promoting a policy related to the immigration of Han Chinese to the plateau.

The most significant political novelty of this time was presented by the Dalai Lama in 1988 in a speech to the European Parliament, in which he theorized his own “middle way approach”, which included the explicit renunciation of the claims of independence, along with the request for the granting of total autonomy to the area of Greater Tibet.

Faced with this declaration, the Chinese government was greatly embarrassed because, while it had no intention of discussing the contents of the proposal, it had already declared that the negotiations could range over any issue outside the demands for independence. In the end, the party of intransigence prevailed, and the Dalai Lama’s intervention was branded as an implicit demand for independence.

The subsequent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama in 1989 encouraged them to continue their work of raising the political awareness of foreigners to their cause. The motivation for the prize was their opposition to the use of violence in the struggle for the liberation of Tibet.

In the following decades, the positions that are still supported by the two sides were outlined. Beijing persuaded itself not to consider the Dalai Lama a reliable interlocutor, proceeding unilaterally to stabilise the Tibetan area by frequently applying martial law and controlling the risks of revolt. The dialogue with the exiles was significantly reduced, and at times it came to a complete standstill. China also aimed to stimulate economic growth and improve the quality of life through investments to boost productivity and the construction of infrastructure.

China has therefore also taken over the management of religious affairs in the Tibetan area, maintaining strict control over the succession of the most influential Lamas. After the death of the 10th Panchen Lama, the first major rift between Beijing and Dharamsala over a religious issue occurred when the successor designated by the Dalai Lama, Gedhun Chokyi Nyima, was disavowed and abducted. In his place, the Chinese government installed a candidate of its own choosing, Gyeltshen Norbu, appointed through the Golden Urn system.

Between 2002 and 2010, a new round of talks took place between the Dharamsala and Beijing delegates: the two sides had further exchanges of views, which however did not result in anything concrete.

In the days following 10th March 2008, the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising, anti-Chinese demonstrations took place in Lhasa, prompting intervention by the army. This subsequently led to an uprising that gradually spread to the other areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region and later to the Chinese provinces included in Ethno-Cultural Tibet. During those days, harsh ethnic clashes took place between Chinese and Tibetans.

The Dalai Lama, while condemning the extreme gestures on both sides, has bitterly noted that some fringes of Tibetans, especially young people, contest him and have difficulty accepting his compromise position that includes renouncing independence and abstaining from violence.

In 2011, the Dalai Lama retired from active politics, leaving the role of head of the Central Tibetan Administration to the newly created figure of Sikyong. The latter brings together the former powers of the Kalon Tripa (Chief Executive) and the prerogatives of political leader that were held by the Dalai Lama.

In 2025, the Dalai Lama reiterated his willingness to promote the position of the “middle way”, which is about renouncing claims to independence and abstaining from violence in political struggle. He also confirmed that the Tibetans in exile will be able to search for a 15th Dalai Lama, to be found outside China through the traditional Tibetan system. He also said that it will be possible for Tibetans to find a way of life in the People’s Republic of China, as long as there is genuine respect for the rights, dignity and needs of a people with a unique linguistic, cultural, religious and historical heritage.

With the passing of the 14th Dalai Lama, it seems unlikely that there will be a candidate who will obtain the consensus of both parties. In the worst-case scenario, a schism could occur between a subject recognized by Beijing and one recognized by Dharamsala.

China claims that currently Tibet is enjoying rapid and sustained growth thanks to social harmony and stability. However, international observers mention some open issues, which hinders the opening of a dialogue. For example, it is believed that efforts should be intensified to enhance the traditional culture of Tibet. In 2023, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging China to guarantee Tibetan youth an education based on their own language and culture. Other observers also claim that ethnic Tibetans are becoming increasingly marginalised in their own territory and gradually being joined by immigrants from other regions of China, especially in the eastern areas of ethnic Tibet.

Infrastructure is undoubtedly beneficial for improving of the quality of life, but many people emphasize the need to pay attention to the protection of the delicate natural environment. For example, one can consider the anthropogenic impact produced by the exploitation of Tibet’s vast mineral resources, as well as the projects carried out in recent years, including the power lines that stretch as far as the eye can see in some parts of the plateau. Also not to be overlooked is the control of one of the most important resources of the future, water. This powerful weapon will be at Beijing’s disposal through the regulation, via large dams, of the flow of the main East Asian rivers that originate in Tibet and flow into the surrounding countries.

If China is in an objective situation of strength, this does not mean that there are not valid reasons to try different approaches to the Tibetan issue, which involve less the emotional sphere and instead emphasise the possible benefits of building a harmonious society in the area. This could also contribute, for China, to the consolidation of cordial and friendship relations with other countries near and far in the international community.

This objective implies the strengthening – within the perimeter of the Chinese Constitution – of effective autonomy in the Tibetan region and other Tibetan communities in China. In this field, a useful inspiration can be offered by the experience of some autonomous areas within European countries, for example some Italian regions and provinces, or some autonomous communities of Spain.

If confrontation does not find a way to resume, the past can never be viewed with neutral eyes. Instead, the ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of China could face the future together, working to build a prosperous country “united in diversity”.

The Tibetan Issue
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See also:


Bibliography

Media resources

The following is an illustrative and non-exhaustive list of Internet resources consulted: some, although inevitably managed by partisan organisations, are very useful for finding documents, statements and information.